commodities
quinta-feira, setembro 25, 2003
wsj 25sep03
defendendo o nosso...o cara eh bom..
September 25, 2003
The Real Cancun
By CELSO AMORIM
BRASILIA -- The Cancun Ministerial Conference did not produce consensus. Discussions among member states of the World Trade Organization remain inconclusive and will have to be taken up by delegations at the WTO's headquarters in Geneva. Although the absence of agreement on modalities for moving forward is a disappointment, in one fundamental aspect Cancun can be seen as positive: Attempts by major trading powers to dilute the Doha mandate on agriculture did not prosper, and the voice of the developing world was taken into consideration.
The question here is not whether a modest outcome would have been better than the absence of results. The real dilemma that many of us had to face was whether it was sensible to accept an agreement that would essentially consolidate the policies of the two subsidizing superpowers -- with very modest gains and even some steps backward (the new, broader definition of "blue box" subsidies to accommodate the U.S. for instance) -- and then have to wait for another 15 or 18 years to launch a new round, after having spent precious bargaining chips.
As coordinator of the Group of 22 developing countries that presented a united front on agriculture, I am convinced that Cancun will be remembered as the conference that signalled the emergence of a less autocratic multilateral trading system. In Brazil, and in a host of developing countries large and small -- which represent 69% of the world's farmers -- Cancun has been hailed as a turning point.
Let me be clear. We are not interested in North-South confrontation. To use an expression made popular by trade negotiators when combating protectionism under its many guises, our platform is about "leveling the playing field," through the full integration of agriculture into the multilateral rules-based trading system. It is about addressing in a decisive manner the most important unfinished business of the Uruguay Round (should I say, business that was never seriously taken up?). It is about honoring the terms of the Doha Development Agenda in an area unanimously viewed as its centerpiece.
Two years ago at Doha, member states agreed to substantially improve market access, phase out export subsidies and substantially reduce distorting domestic support in agriculture. The so-called "mandated negotiations" required by Article 20 of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture had come to a standstill. Certain trading powers insisted that, in the absence of a new round -- with a broad agenda including industrial goods, services and rules on new topics such as investment, competition, trade and environment -- it would not be possible to liberalize their agricultural regimes.
After the Seattle debacle in 1999, this reasoning gained increasing acceptance, and in 2001 political conditions finally allowed for the launching of a round at the WTO Ministerial in the capital of Qatar. It is important to underline, however, that the trade liberalizing exercise launched at Doha represented a long overdue collective commitment to do away with protectionist barriers and trade distorting policies in an area of vital importance to competitive exporters from both the developed and the developing world.
As I had the occasion of stressing in Cancun, no other area of trade is subject to such blatant discrimination as agriculture. Distortions in agricultural trade not only harm efficient exporters by denying them market opportunities. Domestic and export subsidies in developed countries depress prices and incomes throughout the world, cut into export earnings and increase food insecurity in developing countries. Their addictive nature does not contribute to productivity gains or the creation of wealth. They only generate dependence, on one side, and deprivation on the other.
Contrary to what some have said, ours is not a maximalist agenda. In fact, our "offensive" objectives are very similar to those the U.S. used to advance until quite recently. Indeed, these are the sort of proposals the U.S. promoted when I was head of the Brazilian delegation in Geneva and was nominated (by the U.S.!) to chair the Agriculture Committee of the WTO. In Cancun, even after we made a genuine effort to accommodate the interests of our broad-based constituency of developing nations, I would venture to calculate that between 70% and 80% of our proposals corresponded almost literally to what the U.S. upheld until not very long ago. Cancun did not fail on account of agriculture. We were ready to negotiate in earnest. We had prepared amendments for the last text brought to the negotiating table. Our approach was recognized even by those on the other side as "businesslike."
* * *
As we resume negotiations in Geneva -- hopefully with a lighter agenda as regards the "Singapore issues" -- may we bear in mind the lessons of Cancun. The G-22 and other developing countries will not be reduced to the role of supporting actors in discussions that affect their development prospects. Consensus cannot be imposed through pre-cooked deals that disregard previous commitments and ignore the legitimate aspirations of the majority of the world's population. Trade must be a tool not only to create wealth but also to distribute it in a more equitable way.
We are confident that a virtuous alliance among those who support free trade and economic development throughout the globe will prevail in steering the Doha Round to a successful outcome, in line with the promises raised at its inception. Brazil will be working actively with all WTO trading partners to make this possible.
Mr. Amorim is the foreign minister of Brazil.
URL for this article:
http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB106444757752551200,00.html
Updated September 25, 2003
quarta-feira, setembro 24, 2003
FT 23SEP03
Martin Wolf: The abominable no-men
By Martin Wolf
Published: September 23 2003 21:07 | Last Updated: September 23 2003 21:07
The collapse of the ministerial meeting of the World Trade Organisation in Cancún, earlier this month, was a triumph for the "abominable no-men" of world trade. At the head of that list are France and India. The former is dedicated to preventing the European Union from offering a decent deal on agriculture. The latter is as dedicated to creating a blocking coalition of developing countries against serious liberalisation. Their tacit alliance won. But the world lost.
Those of us who decided to stay at home find it difficult to understand why the meeting collapsed. Some argue that the Mexican minister made a blunder in closing the meeting at a moment when, in the words of Supachai Panitchpakdi, the WTO's director-general, "we seemed to be making real progress". Others blame the recalcitrance of leading developing countries, the demands of a number of small developing countries, or the obduracy of the EU and the US. Presumably, there is truth in all these charges. These huge ministerial meetings are circuses.
Yet the world must find a way forward. That is perfectly possible; but only if a limited number of big operators first reaches a consensus on the desirability of doing so.
This should not be that hard to achieve. In particular, it should be possible for most developing countries to realise that they would be huge losers from failure of the Doha round, let alone a collapse of the WTO. As the World Bank notes in its latest Global Economic Prospects, the gains of radical liberalisation would be largest for the developing countries, because they confront and, more important, impose the highest barriers to trade.
The Bank examines a scenario with radical cuts in trade-distorting measures by both high-income and developing countries. The static gains generated by this scenario would increase the incomes of developing countries by 1.5 per cent a year, as against 0.5 per cent for the high-income countries. If dynamic effects on inward investment and productivity are added, developing countries' incomes would rise by 3.3 per cent. Two-thirds of the global gains are from agricultural liberalisation alone. More important, most of the developing countries' gains would come from their own agricultural liberalisation, not liberalisation by others.
That protection is a tax on the more efficient parts of one's own economy, particularly exports, seems hard for most people to understand. But one point made by the Bank is not so obscure. Everybody knows that the protection of high-income countries is biased against poor countries. What is not so well known is that the barriers imposed by developing countries on imports from one another are even higher. In 1997, the average tariff met by east Asian non-agricultural exports to south Asia was 28.1 per cent, far above the 5.1 per cent tariff met by exports to high-income countries.
By reducing their own protection, developing countries should make big gains. Equally, a negotiation on competition that tackled global restrictive practices, on public procurement that increased transparency, or on services that improved the efficiency of their own economies, would be strongly in their interests. Yet even though the gains for developing countries from a successful round would be greater than those for the high-income countries, the latter would gain, too.
Nor, contrary to what Robert Zoellick, the US trade representative, suggested in the FT on September 22, is there a realistic alternative to the WTO. Mr Zoellick may wish to expend his energies on bilateral deals instead of twiddling his thumbs in Washington. But signing deals with marginal operators is therapy rather than serious policy. It is no strategy for a superpower. Such agreements will do nothing about the biggest distortions in world trade, particularly agriculture. Nor will they improve relations with the most important players. At best, they may chivvy the recalcitrant back to the negotiating table. At worst, they will undermine the objective, pursued by the US since the 1930s, of a non-discriminatory, rule-governed, global trade regime.
The starting-point now is to accept that negotiations do not have to include every WTO member. The top 20 importers (with the EU counted as one) account for 80 per cent of world merchandise imports and the top 50 for 92 per cent. It should be a matter of indifference what the rest of the WTO's members do with their trade regimes. It is true all countries should benefit from liberalisation. But the WTO is not a development agency. It should let insignificant trading entities damage themselves if they wish to do so.
What the world needs is a serious negotiation among about 30 countries (with the EU again counted as one). This is perfectly feasible if the idea that the outcome must bind every member is abandoned. On such new issues as competition, investment and public procurement, the best way to proceed, at this stage, is via codes that do not commit all members, an approach used in the Tokyo round of trade negotiations. These need cover only important trading countries.
A similar principle would apply to market access. Nobody should care what Kenya does with its import barriers. The best policy would be to offer barrier-free access to the small operators in all sectors, including agriculture. If that is impossible, simply extend any agreed liberalisation to them, in line with the principle of non-discrimination.
Would this approach remove the roadblock? No. It would merely concentrate minds. The majority of WTO members would, once again, become sleeping partners. But the success of negotiations would still depend on the willingness of significant countries to bargain. If the EU, Japan and the US are determined to retain their grotesque farm policies or if China, India and Brazil are determined to retain their present barriers, no negotiation can succeed.
That, not the modalities of the negotiation or the absurdities of ministerial meetings, is the core question. Do the abominable no-men prefer failure to success, existing barriers to lower ones and a chaotic global economy to the rules-governed alternative? If they do, nothing can be done. If they do not, they must restart these negotiations. Big countries need big leaders. Now is the time to demonstrate that they possess them.
martin.wolf@ft.com
terça-feira, setembro 23, 2003
fsp 23sep03
O VAIVÉM DAS COMMODITIES
Quebra ainda maior
A confirmação de quebra de produtividade nas primeiras áreas de soja colhidas nos EUA mostra que nem a safra de 71,9 milhões de toneladas estimada pelo governo -e que tinha surpreendido pela brusca redução- deve se concretizar. O mercado já trabalha com quebra maior.
Foi para os preços
As estimativas de quebra de safra, associadas ao volume em alta das exportações, empurraram os preços ainda mais para cima ontem na Bolsa de Chicago. O contrato de novembro foi a 651,25 centavos de dólar por bushel (27,2 quilos), com alta de 2,1%. Já o de maio subiu para 629,25 centavos de dólar, com alta de 1,5%.
Impurezas
As exigências pela qualidade de soja são cada vez maiores. Para evitar transtornos, o porto de Paranaguá está recusando soja que contenha impurezas. Só neste ano, o porto já recusou a carga de soja de 3.000 caminhões e 400 vagões. Os veículos não puderam descarregar o produto.
Caminho de fora
As exportações médias diárias de soja recuaram para US$ 45 milhões neste mês, 32% menos do que o volume do ano passado. Já as carnes mantiveram tendência de alta, somando US$ 20 milhões por dia e alta de 15% sobre 2002.
Caminho de dentro
Os gastos com a compra de trigo cresceram 19% neste mês em relação a agosto. Sobre setembro de 2002, a alta é de 49%. As importações de adubos e fertilizantes cresceram 176% neste mês. Foram gastos, em média, US$ 13 milhões por dia com esses produtos, segundo a Secex.
Novas compras
A Bunge comprou duas indústrias de moagem de óleo de soja na Índia de agosto para cá. A estratégia da empresa é aumentar a participação no mercado de processamento de óleo da Índia.
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The real lesson of the Cancún failure
Published: September 23 2003 5:00 | Last Updated: September 23 2003 5:00
Even before a post-mortem of the World Trade Organisation's failed Cancún meeting is complete, calls are being made for WTO reform. The European Union wants changes to what Pascal Lamy, trade commissioner, calls the institution's "medieval" structure and decision-making methods. But such proposals are unlikely to get far, because they miss the real target.
The organisation's 148 members will find it no easier to achieve consensus for such reforms than to agree on trade liberalisation. In any case, the main problem is not WTO procedures: it is the gaping disparity between its members' levels of development, a disparity which has grown still wider with the admission of steadily more poor countries. Any attempt to restart the Doha round must grasp that central point.
It is absurd to push, as the EU has done, to impose rules in complex areas such as competition and investment on countries so poor that some cannot even afford WTO diplomatic representation. If such rules have any place in the WTO, all but its richest members should be free to opt in or out of them. Refusing such flexibility will lead only to a repetition of the deadlock that sank Cancún.
The much bigger task is to move ahead with the opening of market that is - or should be - the top priority of negotiators. Efforts should focus on liberalising trade in the economies that matter. As well as the 25 or so industrialised nations, they include a similar number of larger or more advanced developing countries. Among the latter are Brazil, China, India, South Africa, Mexico, Malaysia, Chile and South Korea. This group of about 50 should spearhead a revival of the Doha round.
Its members generate, actually and potentially, most of world trade. They are equipped to negotiate effectively. Opening their markets, which they should do to all WTO members and not just to each other, would boost growth worldwide. The risk of "free-riding" on such market access by poor countries outside the core group is negligible, because they export so little.
The US and EU should take the lead by proposing bold cuts in their border barriers and farm subsidies, conditional on better-off developing countries making serious counter-offers. Even that may not sway truly intransigent opponents of free trade, such as India. But they need to realise that continued protectionism is not a practical option.
Unless they open up and restructure their economies, they will steadily lose more jobs, investment and exports to China and other more dynamic global competitors.
Some may object that limited participation in liberalisation would be a step backwards that would create a two-tier WTO. But as Cancún showed, the organisation is heading in that direction already. It is far better to recognise that reality and seek ways to deal with it than to accept the inevitable alternatives: crippling paralysis and still more bitter internal divisions.
ft editorial defending developing countries 23sep03
lamy on wsj 23sep03
September 23, 2003
COMMENTARY
Post-Cancun Primer:
My WTO 'Q&A'
By PASCAL LAMY
So what happened?!
No point pulling my punches. The Cancun WTO Ministerial talks failed, and the prognosis for the current Round, the Doha Development Agenda, is now a dismal and uncertain one. This is a major setback for both developed and developing countries alike. But that doesn't mean we shouldn't ask a few questions:
• What was Cancun meant to achieve? We were trying to advance work on the package of negotiations agreed to back in 2001 in Doha, and in particular to give the Round sufficient cruising speed to be concluded by the end of 2004. The goal was to have achieved around 50% or so of the work by Cancun, roughly the mid-point in the timetable. It was always going to be a fairly complex process -- 20 issues or so on the table, including difficult questions such as agriculture, and new trade rules in areas such as competition and investment. And the 148 WTO members, as always under the procedures of the WTO, need to agree on a common position by consensus.
• Who walked out? Why couldn't you find agreement? Nobody walked out. After several days of intense negotiations, the Mexican chairman of the conference, Luis Ernesto Derbez, concluded on the final afternoon that there was no prospect of reaching consensus, and that was that. Returning to the golfing metaphor I last used on these pages, where I talked about a good approach shot in Cancun to put the ball in the green, we have only succeeded in putting the ball fairly deep into the bunker.
• So who's to blame for this fiasco? My policy is never to play the blame game, because it is totally unproductive. We all share responsibility for the failure in Cancun. For our part, the EU came to Cancun determined to make things work, determined to listen to other delegations, adjust our proposals.
For example, in the final discussions to try to set up the negotiations on new rules (the "Singapore issues" -- competition, investment, trade facilitation, and transparency in government procurement), which we've been talking about for years -- the EU agreed to drop the agreed negotiations on competition and investment in a move to promote consensus. But at the end, there was an impasse between -- on the one hand -- those (like the Africa group) who wanted no negotiations on the Singapore issues, even on the less contentious subjects (like trade facilitation which aims to cut red tape at the border); and on the other, those (like South Korea) who wanted the whole package, and were unwilling to join our suggested compromise. So progress was blocked on the "Singapore issues."
• But wasn't it just "EU versus the rest" on agriculture as usual? No, even if that is The Wall Street Journal's favorite tune! The EU showed its readiness to move across the board on agriculture. We offered to eliminate export subsidies on products of interest to developing countries. We agreed to reduce trade-distorting support significantly to farmers, following the painful adjustment of our own internal EU policies agreed in June. And finally we offered a major reduction of our tariffs to open up to farm imports. These are not just empty words, but hard facts. And at the request of many countries, the EU and the U.S. pulled together a joint policy framework in August. Not at all a defensive alliance, in fact almost the reverse -- neither of us was ready to accept additional disciplines in agriculture without commitments by the other. But a group of nations led by Brazil and India wanted to pull the text in a different direction. We will never know how far we would have got if the negotiations had continued for another day or so. But I really felt that we were on the verge of a major breakthrough.
• So is the Round now dead? Not dead, but certainly on a life-support machine. And we can hardly expect the ambassadors in Geneva to pick up the work and make progress where we have failed collectively at the political level. I can't say at the moment when we will be able to pick up the pieces, although obviously I hope it will be as soon as possible.
• And can the Round be concluded by the end of 2004? Doesn't look like it. And let's spell out just how serious this is for all of us. The world economy is stuttering. Developing countries and developed countries alike need the additional stimulus that a successful Round can bring via increased trade opening and improved rules. If the Round goes into the fridge for an indeterminate period, we'll all pay the price for this.
• Are bilateral and regional agreements the only answer ? Will the EU adjust its trade policy? That's what some, notably the U.S., have said. The reality is that our trade policy is a mix of both, but it remains the case that I haven't launched any new negotiations since taking office in 1999. We still have a strong preference for the multilateral route -- and frankly, ironically, multilateral negotiations seem to me to be the best way for developing countries to protect their interests against big players like the EU and the U.S. But either way, I get my mandate for all negotiations, whether bilateral or multilateral, from the member states of the EU, and I'll sit down with them as well as with the European Parliament in the near future to adjust our policy as necessary.
• Is the current structure of the WTO up to the job? In my view, no. I said in Seattle that the organization is medieval, but I'm now wondering whether neolithic isn't a more appropriate term. Despite the efforts of a number of very able people, it is unable to handle the weight and complexity of the negotiating issues with 148 members operating under consensus. But there are many variables to adjust, and it's far too simplistic to say that "consensus is the problem." I still find it remarkable that the director general is not equipped with a simple power of initiative. Fine for the WTO to be "member-driven," but with 148 members, that can take you in a lot of different directions.
• And where does this leave the developing countries? You hit the nail on the head. In my view, there's no alternative to the Round for any of us, which means we all -- both developed and developing countries -- need to bring something to the table. But clearly, there is a lot to do at this point to find agreement on the way forward.
Mr. Lamy is the EU's trade commissioner.
URL for this article:
http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB106427969739316700,00.html
Updated September 23, 2003
ft 21sep03
created quite a stir, attacks brz
America will not wait
By Robert B. Zoellick
FT.com site; Sep 21, 2003
The final minutes of the World Trade Organisation session in Cancún were symptomatic of the whole meeting: we stalled after representatives of the least developed, African, and Caribbean countries reported that their colleagues had rejected any negotiation to update the 1947 rules on customs procedures.
The breakdown occurred over measures that would have simply facilitated trade and helped land-locked countries by ensuring prompt release of goods, publication of procedures, and timely and fair rulings on customs questions. These commonsense steps are in the interest of all; their rejection was a political statement. Sadly, this decision was emblematic of a broader culture of protest that defined victory in terms of political acts rather than economic results.
As Luis Ernesto Derbez, Mexico's foreign minister and chairman of the meeting, closed the session, representatives of influential developing countries finally rushed forward to say they wanted to keep going. They correctly recognised that the draft text offered an excellent opportunity to press the European Union to eliminate agricultural export subsidies; to achieve big cuts in farm subsidies in the US, EU and other countries; to impose a ceiling on unbelievably high Japanese tariffs; and to open agricultural markets for developed and developing countries alike. Yet they were too late.
The previous evening, country after country had scorned the draft text, the negotiating process and other countries. The United Nations General Assembly has its role, but it does not offer an effective model for trade negotiations. A few ministers pointed out that increasingly radical rhetoric would make it harder for all - especially developing country groups with many smaller members - to consider realistic compromises. Countries that feel victimised are unlikely to agree to anything.
Cancún could have followed a different course. Only weeks before, we had worked together to resolve the difficult issue of ensuring that poor developing countries could gain access to low-cost, life-saving medicines while protecting intellectual property. But at Cancún the naysayers' tactics thwarted those who would have cut agricultural subsidies and tariffs, triggering reform of farm policy in the US, EU, Japan, Canada and elsewhere. They passed up an opportunity to open developing country markets gradually to other developing countries. They stymied global sourcing and production networks, which integrate developed and developing country businesses to mutual benefit. And they walked away from rules on openness and transparency that fight favouritism and corruption.
Key mid-level developing countries employed the rhetoric of resistance as a tactic both to put pressure on developed countries and to divert attention from their own trade barriers. India's average bound agricultural tariff is 112 per cent, Egypt's 62 per cent and Brazil's 37 per cent - compared with a US average of 12 per cent. Their average bound tariffs on manufactured goods are at least 10 times larger than the US average of 3 per cent. We should be able to reduce these barriers while protecting the poorest nations and providing flexibilities for special sensitivities in the bigger countries.
After the US pressed the EU to develop an agricultural framework that could achieve farm subsidy and tariff cuts far beyond those achieved in the last global trade negotiation, we asked Brazil and other agricultural powers to work with us. Brazil declined, turning instead to India, which has never supported opening markets, so as to emphasise north-south division not global agricultural reform.
Smaller developing countries resisted the reduction of US and EU tariffs because they calculated that they would lose the advantages offered by special US and EU programmes that eliminate tariffs only for their exports. Unfortunately, these well-meaning trade preference programmes have undermined the push for two-way openings, perpetuating dependency.
Four African countries insisted on "compensation" of between $250m and $1bn annually, and unilateral elimination of cotton subsidies. Over the course of 50 years, global trade negotiations have progressed because countries could trade off cuts across products and even sectors to achieve a balanced result. The US has no export subsidies on cotton and proposed the elimination of all export subsidies. We committed to cut domestic cotton subsidies as part of an overall package that would also have reduced European and Chinese cotton subsidies, along with all agricultural subsidies. Instead of making cotton a symbol, we wanted to make development a reality through concrete results for cotton farmers, exporters and manufacturers of cotton products, along with all farmers.
The tactics of confrontation included an assault on one of the few devices that the WTO can use to prod its 148 members towards consensus: presenting a chairperson's text for discussion and negotiation. Brazil, India and others refused even to work off an agricultural text drafted by the Uruguayan WTO chairman and forwarded by the WTO's Thai director-general. Even after Singapore's tireless minister had worked non-stop with all parties to prepare a new agricultural draft reflecting a balanced compromise, Brazil and its colleagues presented a massive list of required changes. If they were serious about negotiating a compromise for 148 countries, they overplayed their hand by failing to signal that intention. They returned home without any cuts in subsidies and tariffs.
As Chairman Derbez closed the Cancún meeting, he asked countries to reassess prospects by December 15. We know well what developing countries are demanding, but have not heard whether more competitive developing economies will cut their high barriers. We do not know whether other developing countries that blocked action in Cancún will now accept packages that ask little or nothing of them. The US stands ready to work with the draft text across the full agenda. As the Doha negotiations drift into next year, however, we recognise that a new European Commission may reflect different perspectives.
Many countries - developing and developed - were dismayed by the transformation of the WTO into a forum for the politics of protest. Some withstood pressure to join the strife from larger developing neighbours. Of course, negotiating positions differed. But the key division at Cancún was between the can-do and the won't-do. For over two years, the US has pushed to open markets globally, in our hemisphere, and with sub-regions or individual countries. As WTO members ponder the future, the US will not wait: we will move towards free trade with can-do countries.
The writer is US trade representative
